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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF
STARE DECISIS CAN COMPEL INTERVENTION OF RIGHT
UNDER RULE 24 (a)
I N Atlantis Development Corporation v. United States,' the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that one who claims an interest
relating to the very property and the very transaction which is the
subject of a judicial determination may intervene as a matter of
right under recently-amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24 (a) (2) when the disposition of the litigation may impair his own
claim because of the operation of stare decisis. Atlantis Develop-
ment Corporation sought to intervene in an action brought by the
United States to enjoin several defendants from erecting caissons on
allegedly government-owned reefs off the Florida coast. Atlantis,
believing that ownership of the reefs was vested in it by right of
discovery and occupation, had previously expended a considerable
sum for surveys and construction upon the reefs, and had requested
the Government to either recognize its ownership or initiate litiga-
tion which would resolve the dispute. It was Atlantis that requested
the Government to bring suit against the main defendants. The
district court, without opinion, denied the motion to intervene,
2
and while appeal was pending, rule 24 (a) was amended to provide
for intervention of right
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
The court of appeals, pursuant to the Supreme Court order approv-
ing the amendment,4 gave the amendment retroactive effect, reversed
the district court order, and authorized Atlantis to intervene as of
right.
Prior to the 1966 revision, subsection (3) of rule 24 (a) provided
for intervention of right whenever the applicant was "so situated as
1 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
2 Id. at 822.
a FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2).
' 384 U.S. 1031 (1966).
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to be adversely affected by a distribution ... of property which is
... subject to the control or disposition of the court .... " Inter-
vention pursuant to this subsection was traditionally limited to third
persons claiming a legal or equitable interest in a "fund" or res7
which had come under court control. Former subsection (2) pro-
vided for intervention of right "when the representation of the appli-
cant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action ....,,
Although courts commonly held that an applicant was bound within
the meaning of this subsection "only when he may be subject to a
plea of res judicata," 9 a few courts preferred to give the word a
"utilitarian and realistic interpretation,"1 0 developing what the
Atlantis court denominated the "ameliorative exceptions" to the
res judicata rule."1 Under this liberal interpretation of "bound,"
for example, intervention was held to be of right when an applicant
would have been without legal recourse after judgment, 2 when the
case involved review of an administrative regulation, 8 or when there
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (8), 829 U.S. 858 (1947).
6 See Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 187 (1944)
(defendant's competitor lacked sufficient "interest" to intervene in antitrust suit);
Vaughan v. Dickinson, 19 F.R.D. 323 (W.D. Mich. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Duffy v.
Vaughan, 237 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam) (judgment creditor of plaintiff
held to have no "direct interest'); United States v. Columbia Gas 9- Elec. Corp., 27 F.
Supp. 116 (D. Del.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v.
United States, 108 F.2d 614 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 687 (1939). See generally 4
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 24.09 (1950, Supp. 1966).
7 See, e.g., United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, 202 F. Supp. 340 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (court's licensing power not a "res" for intervention purposes); cf. Cameron v.
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1946); White v. Hanson,
126 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1942). But see Formulabs v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th
Cir. 1960) (discovery procedures disclosing trade secret constitute rule 24 (a) property
disposition). See generally 2 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRAcricE AND PRO.
cFuRE § 598 (Wright ed. 1961, Supp. 1966).
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2), 308 U.S. 28-29 (1939) (emphasis added).
9 Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 122, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1958);
accord, Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 874 (W.D. Ark. 1953) (serious economic con-
sequences insufficient); Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, UMW, 3 F.R.D. 251
(w.D. Va. 1943) (bound, "in a sense," by stare decisis insufficient).
1o Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104, 110 (8th Cir. 1960); accord, International Mortgage
& Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1962); Clark v. Sandusky,
205 F.2d 915, 918-19 (7th Cir. 1953); Knapp v. Hankins, 106 F. Supp. 43, 46-48 (E.D.
IlM. 1952); cases cited notes 12-14 infra and accompanying text.
11579 F.2d at 825.
12 Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957).
is Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Textile
Workers Union v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
909 (1956).
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was the possibility of the establishment of adverse precedents. 14 The
Supreme Court halted this liberal trend in Sam Fox Publishing
Company v. United States,'5 which held that "bound" meant "legally
bound,"' 6 i.e., in a res judicata sense.
In part, the 1966 revision of rule 24 (a) corrected specific defects
in both former subsections. The "bound" language of former sub-
section (2), which had led to the Sam Fox holding, was eliminated.
Similarly, the new rule discarded the subsection (3) notion that a
fund or other "disposition of property" is requisite to intervention.'7
The revised rule did, however, retain the existing threshold require-
ments for intervention as a matter of right-an interest, inadequately
represented. Significant, however, was the deliberate effort to "dove-
tail" revised rules 19 (joinder) and 23 (class actions) with the new
intervention rule in order to place greater emphasis on "the practi-
calities of the various factual situations involved"' 8 and less on
sterile legal concepts.19 In identifying persons who should be joined
if feasible, the type of action which should represent and bind a class
rather than merely the litigants, and persons who should be entitled
to intervene, the new rules all use similar or identical language to
stress the need to protect parties who otherwise might, as a practical
matter, be impeded in the protection of their interests. 20 This
pragmatic approach was intended to expand the availability of the
rules and increase their use, thereby alleviating the necessity for
"repeated lawsuits on the same essential subject matter."2' 1
Although recognizing the question-begging nature of its analysis,
the Atlantis court, noting the Advisory Committee's attempt to
inosculate the policy underlying the revised rules, suggested that
hereafter the question of whether intervention of right exists may
often turn "on the unstated question of whether joinder of the
intervenor was called for under new Rule 19. ' 22 Aware of Atlantis'
'4 Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960).
25 366 U.S. 683 (1961). See generally Comment, Intervention of Right in Class
Actions: The Dilemma of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) (2), 50 CALIF. L. R.y.
89 (1962).
16 366 U.S. at 694.T Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109 (1966).
18 Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204 (1966).
19 See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 90, 99, 109 (1966).
20 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (a) (2) (i), with FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2), and FED. R.
Civ. P. 23 (b) (1) (B).
21 Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 91 (1966).
22 379 F.2d at 825.
continuing attempts to develop the reefs, and substantial investments
toward that end, the court had no difficulty finding that Atlantis
claimed an interest relating to the property or transaction (the right
to build structures with or without permission of the Government)
which was the subject of the main suit. Furthermore, there was no
doubt that Atlantis was inadequately represented since both parties
to the litigation claimed interests clearly adverse to those of Atlantis.
A more difficult problem, however, was whether a disposition on
the merits would impair or impede Atlantis' ability to protect its
interests. The court noted that, because of the identity of the
issues raised by Atlantis' claim with those which would necessarily be
decided in the main case, Atlantis' claim might be rendered worth-
less by operation of stare decisis, a principle closely followed within
the Fifth Circuit.23 Thus, as a practical matter, Atlantis' ability to
protect its interests in the reefs would be impaired. The court, how-
ever, was careful to point out that intervention of right is not com-
pelled in every case in which the operation of stare decisis might
create a "substantial obstacle" to the applicant in future litiga-
tion.24 Requiring intervention of right in this case, the court
concluded, was the proposed intervenor's claim to and an interest
in the very property and the very transaction which was the subject
of the action.25
The court's conclusion that stare decisis may, in some cases,
sufficiently impair a person's ability to protect his interest seems
justified both by the language of the rule and by the drafters' official
comments.28  The importance of Atlantis, therefore, may lie more in
the limitations which it suggests than in the pragmatic viewpoint
from which it was written. In light of the Supreme Court's Cascade
Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural Gas Company27 holding
which implied that the "interest relating to" language of the new
rule28 should be liberally construed, not limited to the customary
legal or equitable interest notion2 9 the Atlantis court's reiteration of
2 1 Id. at 828.
21 Id. at 829.
25 Id. at 825-26, 829.
28 See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 109-11 (1966).
2 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
118 FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2). See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
29386 U.S. at 135-36 (divestiture proceeding affecting intervenor's sole supplier).
Compare El Paso, with cases cited note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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the importance of Atlantis' interest in the disputed transaction and
property is significant. Future litigants undoubtedly will seek to
intervene on the basis of interests less specific than the traditional,
direct claim of ownership interest in Atlantis-necessitating exposi-
tion of the language "interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action .. "..-30 In many cases, some
"interest" of a non-party may be affected by the outcome of an
action. If, however, the focus is placed in the first instance on the
potential harm, rather than on the quality of the interest upon
which intervention is sought, much of the rule 24 (b) provision for
permissive intervention when a common question of law or fact
exists would be rendered extraneous. Construed in this light, as
Atlantis indicates, rule 24 (a) seems to require the traditional owner-
ship interest for intervention as a matter of right. Once this interest
has been established, however, potential injury too remote under
previous rule 24 (a) may now prescribe intervention upon proper
application of the party whose interest may be injured.
10FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2). See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1967: 1251] FEDERAL PROCEDURE 1255
